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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FRAUD AS A MATTER OF
LAW WHERE FACTS WERE CLEARLY IN DISPUTE.
As his lead argument in response to Appellants' Brief, Reott asserts that "the

District Court did not make 'findings'" but rather did nothing more than apply facts to
law in reaching the conclusion that there was a fraudulent transfer. Reott Br 14-17.
Reott acknowledges that the Fraudulent Transfer Act requires a finding of "actual intent
to defraud, hinder or delay" a creditor, but then asserts that actual intent is too "difficult
to prove absent an outright admission" so the law allows intent to be proved through
"badges of fraud." Reott Br 15. Proving badges of fraud (Reott contends) substitutes for
proof of actual intent: "[I]f certain codified and common law factors [i.e., the 'badges of
fraud'] are established, 'actual intent' may be proven and the statutory elements are
established." Reott Br 16. In Reott's view, proof of fraud is simple arithmetic —
evidence of even one "badge of fraud" equates to proving a fraudulent transfer as a
matter of law, with no need to hear live testimony, weigh evidence or make any further
inquiry. Reott Br 39.
Reott's only authority for this remarkable assertion is Territorial Savings & Loan
Ass 'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), in which this Court made the
unremarkable point that "badges of fraud" "throw suspicion on a transaction." Reott Br
15. However, even a cursory reading of Territorial Savings makes clear that this case
does not support Reott's extravagant contention that the existence of a "badge of fraud"
mandates a finding of fraudulent intent. To the contrary, within four sentences of the

1

phrase Reott highlights, the Territorial Savings court set forth the following points that
govern any finding of fraud based on alleged "badges of fraud":
•

"Actual fraud is never presumed, but instead must be established by clear
and convincing evidence";

•

"Fraudulent intent is ordinarily considered a question of fact...";

•

Badges of fraud "do not of themselves or per se constitute fraud";

•

"Their value as evidence is relative, not absolute";

•

"They are not usually conclusive proof; they are open to explanation"; and

•

Their weight varies according to "the special circumstances attending the
case."

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Montana Nat 'I Bank v. Michels, 631 P.2d 1260, 1263
(Mont. 1981)).
In granting partial summary judgment in favor of Reott, Judge Bryner engaged in
fact finding on two levels: first, he determined that certain isolated facts were "material,"
/. e., they were "badges of fraud," and second, he presumed that these so-called "badges
of fraud" constituted fraud. Thus, the trial court's errors include (a) inferring actual
intent, (b) viewing the "badges of fraud" as conclusive or absolute on the issue of intent
rather than considering fraudulent intent as a question of fact, and (c) disregarding
extensive offsetting facts, explanations and arguments refuting the notion that Wasatch's
acquisition of the Section 32 interests was a fraudulent conveyance. Even if Reott were
correct in asserting that Wasatch and BBC did not adequately dispute the substantive

2

facts cited as "badges of fraud/'1 an assertion that these appellants strongly contest, the
trial court erred in embracing those "badges" as irrefutable evidence of fraudulent intent
sufficient to permit the entry of partial summary judgment on the fraudulent conveyance
claim. See id.; Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Co, v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App 353 f
18, 144 P.3d 261 ("[T]he fact that there are other equally plausible inferences to be drawn
from the evidence manifests that summary judgment should not have been granted.");
Charvoz v. Cottrell, 361 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1961) ("[E]ven if the facts are undisputed,
if fair-minded men can honestly draw different conclusions from them, the issue of
negligence should be settled by a jury."); Anderson v. Bransford, 116 P. 1023, 1023
(Utah 1911) (same: summary judgment is inappropriate where there are "different
deductions or inferences arising from undisputed facts").
Apart from these legal errors, the record shows that Wasatch and BBC did fully
and sufficiently dispute the materiality of the facts labeled by Reott and the trial court as
"badges of fraud." To begin with, in the introductory statement to its reply to the
"undisputed facts" as articulated by Reott below, Wasatch objected to those "facts" as
being "mainly contentions regarding the legal meaning of the underlying documents —
which, of course, are not [facts] at all, but legal argument. . . ." R. 4076-79.
That Wasatch and BBC did not belabor this clear disregard for the mandates of
1

As he did below, Reott selects certain facts to include in his Appellee's Brief
while disregarding facts that point to or would support a different result than that adopted
by the trial court. Reott Br. at 2 - 9. Moreover, Reott inconsistently asserts in his brief
that Wasatch and BBC failed to dispute sufficiently the material facts (Reott Br. at 9) and
then later that "Reott's fraudulent transfer argument was unopposed" (Reott Br. at 39).
Clearly it cannot be both; a close review of the record demonstrates that neither statement
is correct.
3

Utah R. Civ. P. 56 by repeating the point as to each of the dozens of "undisputed facts"
infected in this manner was simply a matter of economy, not concession. In fact,
Wasatch did specifically restate the disputes regarding the "significance" and
"materiality" of several of the most crucial facts in dispute, including Mr. Sutton's
authority to act for Mission, the new lease issued to Wasatch by SITLA after it approved
the Mission-Wasatch transfers, and Wasatch's "recording" of the lease transfers in the
public records of SITLA versus the county recorder. R. 4076-78. Absent Reott's
repeated spin (entirely appropriate at trial but not at the stage of summary adjudication),
the facts he assembled were innocuous and of no legal consequence. Unvarnished facts
detailing the sequence of events, the identities of the players, and the types of transactions
were not in dispute (but did not and could not add up to fraud as a matter of law). What
Wasatch and BBC have consistently disputed are the sinister inferences Reott asked the
trial court to draw from those facts and which he now asks this Court to affirm on appeal.
If the trial court felt compelled to reach issues of motive and equity, all Wasatch and
BBC asked for was a trial: the opportunity to call live witnesses and otherwise to present
evidence of the parties' true intent and the true course of the transactions.
No further statement of dispute was required to prevent the entry of summary
judgment. Wasatch's general objection echoed what the established standard for
summary judgment already requires. Under Rule 56(e), a court may draw inferences
from undisputed facts, but only in favor of the nonmoving parties. See, e.g., Tretheway v.
Miracle Mortgage, Inc., 2000 UT 12 Tf 2, 995 P.2d 599; Butterfieldv. Okubu, 831 P.2d
97, 107 (Utah 1992) ("doubts about whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue
4

of material fact should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go to trial"). The
parties relied on this standard by invoking Rule 56. R. 2497, 3075
More significantly, Wasatch documented extensive explanatory facts that, if
believed by the trier of fact, would support a far different and more benign view of the
Wasatch-Mission agreement and related transfer than that advocated by Reott and
embraced by Judge Bryner. Wasatch did so in the statement of facts supporting
Wasatch's cross-motion for summary judgment re: redemption (R. 2625-2633), in
response to Reott's asserted facts regarding fraudulent conveyance (R. 4084-85), in
affidavits, deposition testimony and other documents submitted in support of its
memoranda (R. 2509-19, 2523-24, 2567-68, 2627, 3952-63, 4035-39), and elsewhere (R.
2683-84, 3975, 5410). In addition, Wasatch and BBC argued against Reott's attempts to
give the facts consequences that the law does not compel or that, at the summary
judgment stage, required the trial court improperly to draw inferences. R. 3955-56, 3966,
4088-4106.2
All of these arguments were advanced to dispute the materiality of Reott's "facts"
— to dispute their purported status as "badges of fraud." Wasatch's and BBC's opening
brief details several examples, and gives record citations, demonstrating that Wasatch
directly disputed the "badges of fraud" or offered additional evidence below that, if

2

In its reply memorandum, Wasatch specifically refuted Reott's contentions
regarding the recording of the leases, notice, Mission's intent, Mr. Sutton's authority,
SITLA's approval of the transfers, the scope of Reott's judgment liens, the amount of
consideration paid by Wasatch, Wasatch's payments to maintain the Section 32 leases,
and the purported requirements of Mission's operating agreement vis-a-vis its course of
conduct. R. 4088-4106.
5

believed, would show that Reott's facts were not indicia of fraud and, thus, not
"material." Appellants' Br 13-17, 41-43. Moreover, the disputes of fact are made all the
clearer by Reott's repeated attempts to explain them away in his brief. Reott expends
pages contesting the evidence regarding Mission's intent, Mr. Sutton's authority, the
sufficiency of consideration for the Letter Agreement,3 and other "badges of fraud."
Reott Br 29-36, 41-50.
By accepting wholesale Reott's characterization of the evidence as "badges of
fraud" when the facts in the record also supported a benign view of events, or a view
favorable to Wasatch and BBC, and then drawing the inference of fraud from those
alleged "badges," the trial court improperly weighed disputed evidence and resolved
inconsistencies in favor of Reott, the moving party. Fact finding at either of these levels
was error. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c), properly applied, afford
Wasatch and BBC the benefit of an evidentiary hearing regarding any claim that (a) the
conduct of Wasatch or Mission rose to the level of "badges of fraud" and (b) the
evidentiary weight accorded those alleged badges sufficed to support a finding of
fraudulent intent.
In summary, because the trial court both (1) found that certain facts were
"material" as "badges of fraud" (when the meaning of those facts was clearly disputed in
the record) and (2) drew the inference of fraud from the alleged "badges" (when the
evidence would support other, benign explanations ), this Court should reverse or vacate

Reott admits at page 44 of his Brief that "The sufficiency [i.e., amount] of
consideration is disputed."
6

the entry of summary judgment on the fraudulent conveyance claim. Moreover, the
Court should do so regardless of its holding on the redemption issue (discussed next)
because the trial court's fraudulent conveyance findings have potentially far reaching
impact in this litigation on remand. With a finding of fraudulent conveyance, Reott is
poised to execute his $238,594 deficiency judgment (what remains of his judgments after
deducting his $1.00 credit bid at the Sheriffs Sale) against other BBC leases without any
opportunity for Wasatch and BBC to contest the fraud theory at a trial on the merits.
II.

REOTT CANNOT RAISE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AFTER
THE SHERIFF'S SALE,
A.

Reott Chose to Enforce His Liens at the Sheriffs Sale, Rather Than
First Seek to Establish Fraudulent Conveyance as to the Section 32
Interests, Thereby Electing His Remedy and Relinquishing Standing to
Challenge Wasatch's Right of Redemption.

Before the August 9, 2001 Sheriffs Sale, Reott as a judgment creditor had
standing and full opportunity to challenge any party, including Wasatch, purporting to
occupy a place in the chain of title at variance with or superior to the rights then held by
Reott. The cases Reott now cites holding that a creditor can challenge another's claim of
title on the basis of fraud support this proposition. See Olsen v. Bank ofEphraim, 93
Utah 364, 68 P.2d 195, 198 (1937); Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984),
abrogated on other grounds by RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 96 P.3d 935).
However, nothing in these cases (or any other Utah case) supports Reott's further
contention that a judgment creditor who neglects first to assert superior title but opts
instead to execute on his judgments through a sheriffs sale, thereby obtaining full legal
benefit of that superior title, can thereafter challenge a redemptioner's right to redeem.
7

It is black letter law in Utah that a lien that is executed through judgment and
sheriffs sale is "exhausted]," "terminated," and "defunct," and "no further proceeding
under it [is] possible." Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d 77, 78 (Utah 1975); see also David
A. Thomas and James J. Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law,
825 (LEXIS 1999) (the effect of the redemption is "as though the obligation had been
paid without ever resorting to foreclosure" and the foreclosed lien "is extinguished").
The purchaser at the sheriffs sale acquires an interest in the property, but does so subject
to the right of redemption. Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j). Redemption does not revive a
foreclosed lien. See City Consumer Serv., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 236 (Utah 1991)
("The position of a junior lienor whose security is lost through a senior sale is different
from that of a selling senior lienor. A selling senior can make certain that the security
brings an amount equal to his claim against the debtor or the fair market value, whichever
is less, simply by bidding in for that amount.'" (quoting RoseleafCorp. v. Chierghino, 59
Cal.2d 35, 36 (1963) (Traynor, J.) (emphasis added))); Clawson, 535 P.2d at 78
("[Redemption] gave no vitality to [the foreclosing party's] defunct claim."); cf. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (2006) ("There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt or
the enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate . . ..").
Here, Reott elected not to challenge Wasatch's claim of title when that opportunity
was legally available to him. Instead, he took the more direct route of executing on his
three judgments. Having chosen his remedy and successfully asserted the superiority of
his rights, Reott relinquished his judgment creditor status by accepting his own $1.00
credit bid at the Sheriffs Sale.
8

B.

Reott's Real Concern Is His Own $1.00 Credit Bid.

Had Reott bid the face amount of his judgments or the fair market value of the
encumbered leases, the present dispute would never have arisen. Either he would have
recovered the full value of his judgments or he would have obtained title to the property.
Instead, he took the chance that no one would redeem against his $1.00 credit bid.
Unfortunately for Reott, this gamble proved unwise, at least if the goal was to obtain the
Section 32 interests, the Lavinia 1-32 Well and the BLM interests for the total sum of
$1.00 and simultaneously preserve his judgments essentially intact to enforce against
other properties. His nominal credit bid set the redemption amount at a correspondingly
nominal amount. Thus, the belated attack on Wasatch embodied in this litigation seeks to
undo the consequences of Reott's short-sighted strategy, a salvage attempt the law does
not permit.
Contrary to Reott's contentions, Mission's transfer of the Section 32 leases to
Wasatch did not and was not intended to "keep the property away from Mission's
creditors, such as Reott." Reott Br 11, 42-44. Reott was a secured creditor. Nothing
Wasatch or anyone else could do would "keep the property away" from Reott. He had a
protected interest in the leases, superior to that of Wasatch and fully insulated against any
transfers, regardless of their terms. This no doubt explains why Reott elected not to
challenge Wasatch's claim of title before the Sheriffs Sale. He could foreclose and
extinguish Wasatch's interest.
Moreover, Reott knew or should have known at the time of the Sheriffs Sale that
Wasatch was a potential redemptioner. Reott's judgment liens attached to leases in
9

Section 32 that were numbered and maintained in public files by SITLA, as is customary
in the industry. R. 2558-65, 2569-80. Indeed, Wasatch was the only party that
realistically could have redeemed. Mission had abandoned the Section 32 leases
following the transfer to Wasatch. Reott admits (Reott Br 32) that Wasatch exclusively
operated and maintained the Section 32 leases, and Reott's counsel acknowledged in
correspondence with the State of Utah that Wasatch received "an assignment of a Utah
State mineral lease ... from Mission prior to the Sheriffs Sale," so it is clear that Reott
was aware of Wasatch's interest in the leases. R. 4035-39, 2610-11. Notably, Reott
contacted Wasatch by telephone the very day following the Sheriffs Sale to request
access to Wasatch's pipeline. R. 2762.
By credit bidding just $ 1.00 at the Sheriffs Sale, Reott voluntarily surrendered his
secured status, extinguished his lien, and placed himself in the predicament in which he
now finds himself. This was not Wasatch's doing and, whatever motive one might now
ascribe to Mission or Wasatch in the transfer of the Section 32 interests, that transfer
could not impact in the least Reott's status by reason of the Sheriffs Sale.
C.

Utah Law Prohibits Reott From Belatedly Asserting Fraudulent
Conveyance to Control the Right of Redemption.

The right of redemption exists as a check on undermarket bids. It is the
undisputed policy of Utah to advance that purpose by liberally construing the rules and
statutes permitting redemption. See United States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah
1976); Brockbank v. Brockbank, 2001 UT App 251 U 12, 32 P.3d 990; Tech-Fluid
Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

10

This Court's decisions in Brockbank and Tech-Fluid dictate the outcome in this
appeal. Reott's attempts to limit those decisions to their facts disregard the breadth and
clarity of this Court's holdings in the two cases. Both cases are unequivocal in their
statement of the law of redemption. Both prevented creditors who had underbid at a
sheriffs sale from contesting the right of redemption, even when the redemption right
was allegedly obtained by fraud {Brockbank) or the redemptioner's status as successorin-interest or its compliance with Rule 69 were questionable {Tech-Fluid). "The
judgment creditor always has it in his power to make the land sold under execution of his
judgment bring its real value, so that, if redemption is effected, he cannot be hurt"; thus,
if the creditor underbids, he "should not now be heard to complain" — he is "bound by
[his] choicesr Brockbank, 2001 UT 25 H 12 n. 3; Tech-Fluid, 787 P.2d at 1335
(emphasis added).
Brockbank specifically held that the purchaser at a sheriffs sale cannot assert
fraud to defeat or control redemption: "[T]he transfer of the right of redemption cannot
be a fraudulent conveyance," "notwithstanding any actual, subjective intent of [the
debtor] 'to hinder, delay or defraud' the creditor." 2001 UT 251ffif12, 15 (emphasis
added). "To allow a foreclosing creditor to control the right of redemption is inconsistent
with the purpose of that right" because the amount the sheriffs sale purchaser bids "is
within the creditor's control." Id. atffif 12, 14.4

4

Reott's attempt at page 21 of his brief to distinguish Brockbank by drawing a line
between the transfer of the right of redemption in isolation and the transfer of that right as
part of a bundle of rights in a property has neither intuitive nor case support. Certainly,
this Court in Tech-Fluid attached no significance to the fact that the right of redemption
11

The only authorities Reott cites to support his contrary assertion that a sheriffs
sale purchaser can challenge the right of redemption are four cases decided between the
years of 1836 and 1912 by Alabama, Colorado, Iowa and New York state courts.5 Not
one of these cases has ever been cited by a Utah court, and three have not been cited by
any court on any point since 1938. Reott fails to direct this Court to any Utah cases or
any contemporary or persuasive authority from any other jurisdiction purporting to
counter this Court's decisions in Brockbank and Tech-Fluid.
As a matter of Utah law, Reott has no claim or defense to Wasatch's redemption
based on fraudulent conveyance. Having relinquished his judgment creditor status at the
Sheriffs Sale and suffering no legal injury as a result of his own nominal credit bid (see
Appellants' Br 24-30), he has no standing to defeat or control Wasatch's right of
redemption.6
III.

WASATCH HAD A SUFFICIENT CLAIM TO AND INTEREST IN THE
SECTION 32 LEASES TO REDEEM.

The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Clawson, supra, established that an
equitable interest, even in one who may not have legal title, suffices to support a right of
therein asserted was conveyed as part of a transfer of title rather than as an isolated
transfer.
5

Phyfe v. Riley, 15 Wend. 248 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); Robertson v. Moline,
Milburn & Stoddard Wagon Co., 55 N.W. 495, 496 (Iowa 1893); Francis v. White, 49
Spo. 334, 335 (Ala. 1909); and Casserleigh v. Spar Consol Mining Co., 128 P. 863, 866
(Colo. CtApp. 1912).
6

Reott claims that Wasatch did not raise this standing argument below. As with
his various other contentions that Wasatch failed to raise an issue below, this contention
is not correct and manifests a fundamental misunderstanding of Wasatch's consistent
position in this litigation. The standing argument is central to Brockbank and Tech-Fluid,
which Wasatch argued at great length below. See, e.g., R. 4096-97.
12

redemption. 535 P.2d at 78. Clawson involved a series of three separate executions
against a property originally owned by Spaulding: First, Clawson executed on a
judgment lien and bought the property at a sheriffs sale without redemption, terminating
Spaulding's legal interest in the property. Next, Walker Bank foreclosed on a senior trust
deed, but Spaulding redeemed. Finally, Walker Bank executed on its deficiency
judgment against Spaulding, and an unrelated party purchased the property without
redemption. Clawson sued to quiet title, challenging Spaulding's right to redeem at the
second foreclosure sale because Spaulding had already "parted with all his interest in the
land." Id. at 77-78. Notwithstanding, the court held it was "settled" that Spaulding had
"sufficient interest in the property" because Walker Bank held a deficiency judgment
against him and the amount of the sale affected that judgment. Id. at 78.
Clearly under Clawson, legal title is not required, and a party has sufficient
equitable interest if it has no more than a financial stake in the proceeding. This holding
is consistent with Brockbank and Tech-Fluid and the policy announced in Loosley of
liberally construing the redemption right as a check on undermarket bids. Brockbank,
2001 UT 251 \ 12; Tech-Fluid, 787 P.2d at 1332; Loosley, 551 P.2d at 508. The holding
is not consistent with the hyper-technical approach to title or the "balancing of equities"
encouraged by Reott, and adopted by the trial court, as the measure of the redemption
right.
In the light of Clawson, Tech-Fluid and Brockbank, analysis of legal or equitable
title for purposes of redemption does not require (or permit) a balancing of equities vis-avis competing parties as argued by Reott. Rather, the point is merely to assess whether a
13

particular redemptioner has "sufficient interest in the property" to enable it to redeem.
Clawson, 535 P.2d at 78. This is a low threshold made lower still by a sheriff sale
purchaser's lack of standing to control or defeat the right of redemption and, in this case,
by Mission's complete absence from the scene to seek redemption. To be sure, a
complete stranger cannot suddenly appear and claim a right of redemption, but Wasatch
was not such a stranger. As Tech-Fluid held, '"Successors in interest' clearly include
assignees" as well as parties (such as Wasatch) that assume the operation of a mineral
lease when a prior party (here, Mission) manifests an intent to abandon it. 787 P.2d at
1331 n.3, 1332.
Assessing title in this context is not a beauty contest. And Reott is off base in his
Appellee's Brief to construe Wasatch's claim of equitable title as nothing more than an
attempt to cure allegations of fraud. E.g., Reott Br 33-36 (addressing consideration
supporting the Letter Agreement in terms of his fraud claim). As noted in Point I above,
Wasatch and BBC vigorously dispute the trial court's findings of fraud, but more than
that, the law prohibits Reott from even asserting fraud as a claim or defense to challenge
Wasatch's right of redemption. Brockbank, 2001 UT 251 \ 12. The decisions of this
Court and the Utah Supreme Court consistently teach that a redemptioner's right of
redemption must be assessed on its own merits — notwithstanding any competing claims

"It is inconsistent to suggest that a [party], having abandoned property and
consequently being divested of all interest therein, would still retain a right to redeem, at
least absent some expressed and unambiguous intent by the [party] to retain that right."
Tech-Fluid, 787 P.2d at 1332. Mission abandoned the Section 32 interests after their
transfer to Wasatch. Thereafter, as Reott and his counsel well knew, Wasatch exclusively
operated and maintained the properties. See infra Part II.B.
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or even allegations of fraud — with an eye to the liberal policies favoring redemption.
This approach comports with the standard maxim in quiet title cases that the parties must
prevail on the strength of their own title, not the defects in the title of another. See
Mercur Coalition Mining Co. v. Cannon, 112 Utah 13, 184 P.2d 341, 342 (1947);
Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P.2d 862 (1939).8
Wasatch asserts both legal and equitable claims to the Section 32 interests.
Substantial evidence, improperly disregarded by the trial court, confirms that Wasatch is
entitled to redeem as Mission's successor in interest. This evidence includes:
•

The Letter Agreement - Wasatch obtained a valid Letter Agreement from
Mission promising the transfer of the Section 32 interests. Wasatch gave
consideration, including a payment of $3,696.40, the assumption of
Mission's financial obligations to SITLA, and a right of first refusal for a

Were it appropriate to balance the equities and were Reott able to assert a claim
of fraud as a means of defeating Wasatch's right to redeem, it would still be wrong to
balance the equities in the way Reott proposes because to do so would give him a
windfall. Wasatch did not redeem the Lavinia 1-32 Well (an asset of some value), which
Reott acquired with his $1.00 credit bid. It is worth remembering that the practical effect
of affirming the trial court's partial summary judgment would be to award Reott all of the
Section 32 interests for the price of the same $1.00 credit bid and, further, to permit him
to seek enforcement of the remaining $238,594 deficiency judgment against all other
BBC leases in Carbon County that were originally transferred by Mission to Wasatch.
Even in Horton, on which Reott relies (but which did not involve a redemption),
the court held, "It is not the intent of equity actions such as this to punish a transgressor
or to permit any party, whether innocent or not, to reap a benefit from the fraudulent
transaction
" Thus, the court subordinated the defrauded party's property interest to
other creditors to prevent him from reaping a windfall. 695 P.2d at 107 (emphasis
added). Here, the very purpose of Utah's policy of liberally construing the right of
redemption is to prevent a windfall from an undermarket bid. See Loosely,551 P.2d at
508.
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future drilling deal (a promise that remained in force at the time of the
Sheriffs Sale and Wasatch's redemption notice).9
•

Execution of the SITLA Assignment Forms - Consistent with the Letter
Agreement, Mission's manager executed SITLA assignment forms
transferring the Section 32 interests in the same manner other forms and
documents had been executed, including documents executed for the
benefit of Reott. Reott admits that Mr. Sutton "purported" to transfer the
Section 32 interests on behalf of Mission (R. 2656), and Wasatch
acknowledged receipt from "Mission" on the back of the forms (R. 2558,
2562).

•

SITLA Transfer of Lease Interests to Wasatch - SITLA approved the
assignments and executed documents transferring the Section 32 interests
from Mission to Wasatch. Indeed, SITLA partitioned lease ML 43541 and
signed a new lease with Wasatch (ML 43541 A) that allowed Mission to
retain the Lavinia 1-32 Well, which Wasatch did not acquire and which
now belongs to Reott.10

9

Reott contends that Wasatch's promise to allow Mission to participate in a future
drilling deal was illusory and, thus, did not constitute consideration. Reott Br 33-34.
However, the Supreme Court in Coulter (discussed at length in the Appelants' Brief (3839)) explicitly rejected the argument that a promise is not consideration simply because
the promisor "was not bound to proceed." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d
852, 859 (Utah 1985). "It is not necessary for the promisor to render performance in
order for us to find consideration; the reciprocal promise is sufficient consideration to
form a contract." Id.
10

Under SITLA rules, "No assignment or sublease is effective until approval is
16

•

Mission's Abandonment of Leases - Mission abandoned all of the Section
32 leases except for the lease covering the Lavinia 1-32 Well. Thus, as of
the date of the Sheriffs Sale, only Wasatch stood in a position to exercise
the right of redemption with respect to the Section 32 interests.

•

Wasatch's Operation and Maintenance of the Leases - Wasatch exclusively
maintained and operated the leases, paying rents and other amounts that, if
not paid, would have resulted in termination of the leases, rendering them
valueless. Wasatch paid $4,590 to SITLA,11 and undertook other
geological and engineering work to preserve the leases. (See Tab H to
Appellants' Brief).

In summary, the Supreme Court's ruling in Clawson allows one with funds tied up
in a property purchased at a sheriffs sale to protect that investment, however modest, by
redeeming the property. Wasatch not only invested in the Section 32 leases and paid
consideration to Mission for their transfer, but Wasatch also obtained SITLA's approval
and (as in Tech-Fluid) operated the leases after Mission abandoned them. Wasatch was
not a stranger to Section 32 but rather was the sole involved party as of the date of the
Sheriffs Sale. Each of the actions taken by Wasatch, standing alone, gave Wasatch an
interest in Section 32 sufficient to support exercise of the right of redemption, especially

given. Any assignment or sublease made without approval is void." Utah Admin. Code
R850-20-2200.5(b). As a result, SITLA's approval and issuance of the new lease are
evidence of an assignment of the Section 32 interests to Wasatch.
11

Reott's argument notwithstanding (Reott Br 32), Wasatch clearly presented this
figure below. R. 4035-39.
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under the established policy of liberally construing rules "dealing with redemption" to
prevent the sheriffs sale from becoming "an instrument of oppression." Loosley, 551
P.2d at 508.
CONCLUSION
In Utah, the right of redemption is a check on under-market bids. Reotf s $1.00
credit bid was clearly below market value. That bid alone, and not any action taken by
Mission, Wasatch or BBC, gave rise to Reotf s frustration and spurred his attack on
Wasatch's exercise of the right of redemption in this case. Reott declined to challenge
the bona fides of the Mission-Wasatch transaction when that opportunity was legally
available to him (he had no need to do so because he was a secured creditor), but instead
proceeded to execute on his judgment liens through the means of a Sheriffs Sale. There,
he made an improvident gamble. He extinguished his liens for a bid of $1.00,
presumably hoping that no one would seek redemption and he could pocket a windfall:
mineral rights to four sections and a $238,594 deficiency judgment. Having misjudged
the facts and the law, Reott demands that the courts remedy the consequences of his
misjudgment, consequences for which he is solely responsible.
This Court's precedents mandate a different result. Brockbank and Tech-Fluid are
controlling and preclude Reott from attempting to manipulate the redemption process to
avoid the consequences arising from the events he set in motion by his nominal bid at the
Sheriffs Sale. Wasatch is entitled to redeem the Section 32 interests, and the trial court's
entry of summary judgment to the contrary was error. This Court should reverse and
enter judgment on the redemption issue in favor of Wasatch and BBC as a matter of law.
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In addition, the Court should reverse or vacate the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to Reott on his claim/defense of fraudulent conveyance because the trial court
impermissibly (1) found that disputed facts were "material" as "badges of fraud" and (2)
inferred fraud from those "badges of fraud" when the facts in the record also supported a
contrary, benign view of events. A finding of fraud as to any aspect of Mission's
dealings with Wasatch must await a trial on the merits.
DATED this 19th day of January, 2007.
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